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Abstract. The study investigates the impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on GDP per 
capita and domestic investment in 22 European transition countries from 2000 to 2014 by using 
the system Generalized Method of Moments estimator. The main implications are that cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions have a negative effect on GDP per capita in the year of merger or acqui-
sition, while their lagged level shows a positive impact. From long-term perspective, this type of 
FDI has negative and significant effect on GDP per capita. The results show that one-year lagged 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions positively affects domestic investment, suggesting that spill-
over effects of this type of investment can be expected not earlier than one year after the merger or 
acquisition. The value of this paper is that our results show how the advances in structural reforms 
enhance GDP per capita whereas their influence on domestic investment activity is insignificant. We 
found that there is insignificant impact of the relationship between overall structural reforms and 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions on GDP per capita and domestic investment both in short 
and long run. The originality of this study lies in investigation of the dynamic nature of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions and their economic effects depending on the quality of structural reforms. 
Keywords: cross-border mergers and acquisitions, structural reforms, GDP per capita, domestic 
investment, transition countries, system GMM.
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Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) represents an important development factor for each econo-
my and the basic mechanism of global economic integration. Its inflow is crucial for all host 
countries, especially for those involved in the process of transition to a market economy. 
From the very beginning of their transformation, transition countries focused their attention 
on large-scale FDI mobilization, since they did not have enough of their own resources to 
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finance the costly imitative model of technological modernization (Kulikova, Lobanov 2011). 
They created conditions to attract multinationals and the growth of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (C-B M&A) activity as the dominant mode of foreign entry, by creating incen-
tives such as customs and tax exemptions or direct investment incentives for foreign investors 
(UNCTAD 2003). Their expectations regarding the benefits of FDI are related to a change in 
the production structure (particularly evident in countries in transition), the establishment 
of efficient management and control systems, job creation, the transfer of experience, knowl-
edge and modern innovative technologies, and export growth with an increase in overall 
competitiveness (United Nations 2003).
The experiences of post-socialist countries during their transformation into democratic 
states with a market economy show that their success has largely depended on the quality 
of institutional setting (Efendić et al. 2010; Beck, Leaven 2005). Many of them paid a high 
price for inefficient reform policies, especially in the first years of transition. Their reform 
performance depended on the legacy of macroeconomic distortions, poor market experience, 
involvement in serious regional conflicts, and their remoteness from the international market 
(De Melo et al. 1997). Building institutions in the context of rapid change did not represent 
the best solution for the transformation of their economic systems. Institutional capacity 
and the quality of macroeconomic policy were easily undermined by the rapid process of 
democratization in countries with a poor tradition of law and order (Polterovich, Popov 
2007). This trade-off between democratization and developmental goals (such as democracy, 
participation in decision-making, and civil society) adversely affected the rate of economic 
growth. Economic reforms in transition countries were hindered by institutional traps like 
inefficient but stable norms of behaviour (Polterovich 2008). These obstacles to the reform 
process created a path of development that prevented the further progress of transition coun-
tries in the field of structural reforms.
The aim of this paper was to investigate the magnitude of economic effects of C-B M&As 
on GDP per capita and domestic investment in 22 European transition countries for the peri-
od 2000–2014. We also included the interaction term with overall structural reforms in order 
to assess the conditional effects of C-B M&As on GDP per capita and domestic investment. 
We took into account the fact that structural adjustment in European transition countries 
took place within a framework of international capital flow liberalization. This means that 
institutional double shock affected the features of economic development of these countries 
and, thus, determined the economic effects of C-B M&As. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 contains a brief review of the 
recent empirical studies concerning the influence of FDI inflows on economic growth and 
domestic investment. Data and research methodology are presented in Section 2. Section 3 
gives the empirical results followed by concluding remarks. 
1. Literature review
Since the end of the 1970s, the majority of researchers have focused attention on the econom-
ic effects of FDI as the crucial factor in explaining the differences in development between 
countries. Empirical studies on the relationship between FDI (as well as its components) 
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and economic growth reveal contradictory results. The majority of authors have found evi-
dence that FDI inflows have a positive or neutral effect on host country economic growth. 
For instance, Hlavacek and Bal-Domanska (2016) reported the positive influence of FDI 
on economic growth of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Pegkas (2015) 
examined the effects of FDI on economic growth in the Eurozone countries for the period 
from 2002 to 2012. The author revealed that FDI stock is important factor that positively 
influences the economic growth. Alguacil et al. (2011) argued that FDI had a positive effect 
on output growth but its impact depended on internal and external macroeconomic stability 
and the quality of institutions. 
Similarly, Jude and Levieuge (2017), in a study of 93 developing countries from 1984 to 
2009, found that FDI alone had no significant effect on growth in developing countries, while 
a favourable institutional environment induced a growth-enhancing effect. Albulescu (2015) 
revealed that FDI and portfolio investment exerted a positive impact on long-term economic 
growth in 13 CEE countries for the period between 2005 and 2012. This result is contradic-
tory to the findings of Eren and Zhuang (2015), who found that FDI (as well as M&As and 
greenfield investment) did not have significant growth effects in 12 new member states of the 
European Union (EU) from 1999 to 2010. They pointed out that the growth effects of M&As 
and greenfield investment depended on the availability of absorptive capacities in the host 
countries. On the other hand, Herzer (2012) indicated that FDI produced negative effect on 
growth in 44 developing countries and its impact varied considerably from one country to 
another. By using a general-to-specific model-selection approach, the author revealed that 
such large differences in the growth effects of FDI were mainly due to country specific factors 
like freedom from government intervention, business freedom, FDI volatility, and primary 
export dependence. The empirical study of Azman-Saini et al. (2010) provided evidence that 
FDI by itself does not have positive effect on economic growth and this impact depends on 
the level of economic freedom in recipient countries. 
The empirical studies dealing with the influence of FDI on domestic investment also 
provide mixed results. In the recent empirical study based on firm- and industry-level data 
for the period 2003–2011 by Amighini et al. (2017), the authors showed that FDI produced 
positive spillovers on total investment, in particular within the recipient industries. Farla 
et al. (2016) investigated the impact of institutional quality in mediating the economic effect 
of FDI on domestic investment activity in 46 developing countries from 1996 to 2009. They 
found that FDI has a crowding-in effect, while its interaction with “good governance” causes 
negative megiation effect on domestic investment. Gocer et al. (2014) argued that FDI had a 
crowding-in effect on domestic investment in Asian, Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries, while it had crowding-out effects in African countries. Mileva (2008) demonstrated that 
FDI had higher crowding-in effect in transition countries with less developed financial mar-
kets and weak institutional setting. Other transition countries which entered the final stage 
of transition process could rely on the foreign loans for raising domestic capital formation. 
Tan et al. (2016) evaluated the effects of inward and outward FDI on domestic investment 
using panel data of ASEAN-8 countries. With the help of pool mean group analysis, the 
authors found that both inward and outward FDI have a positive long-run impact on the 
gross domestic investment. 
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On the other hand, the assessment of 4 CEE transition countries by Szkorupová (2015) 
provided evidence that FDI had a negative effect on domestic investment.  The empirical stu-
dies by Wang (2010) and Adams (2009) revealed that FDI had a negative and current effect 
on domestic investment, while the cumulative effect of FDI over time tends to be positive. 
Kosova (2010) found that foreign entry had a negative effect on the growth and survival of 
domestic firms from the Czech Republic between 1994 and 2001. Her findings revealed that 
crowding-out was a short-term or static phenomenon, suggesting that initial foreign entry 
increased the exit rates of domestic firms. The author also pointed out that domestic firms 
enjoyed benefits from a foreign presence over time. These findings are consistent with the 
results of Jude (2014), who demonstrated that FDI also crowded out domestic investment, 
but its impact weakens over time. By considering the effects of two types of FDI on domestic 
investment on the sample of 10 CEE countries from 1990 to 2010, she found that greenfield 
FDI might develop long-term complementariness with domestic investment, while mergers 
and acquisitions did not have any significant effect on domestic investment. Pilbeam and 
Oboleviciute (2012) argued that FDI did not have negative spillovers on domestic enterprises 
in the new EU member states, while it makes negative contribution in the EU-15. Ashraf 
and Herzer (2014) estimated the effects of greenfield investment and C-B M&As on domestic 
investment for the period 2003–2011 for 100 developing countries. Their findings indicated 
that greenfield investment has a marked negative effect on domestic investment, while M&As 
do not have a significant impact. Sikharulidze et al. (2015) showed that FDI discourages do-
mestic investment in Georgia through channels like competition in the product and financial 
market or via superior technology. 
2. Model specification, data and research methodology
For the evaluation of the economic effects of C-B M&As, we used C-B M&As as an ex-
planatory variable and tested it with the help of dependent variables like GDP per capita 
and domestic investment. We estimated the effect of this type of FDI on GDP per capita by 
employing this form of panel model specification: 
 
( )0 1 1 2





it it it it it it
Log GDPpc Log GDPpc M As
M As REF M As REF CON
−
−
= β +β +β +
β +β +β ⋅ +β + ε
 (1)
where the subscript i denotes the ith country (i = 1…22); the subscript t denotes the tth 
year (t = 1…15); β0 to β6 are regression coefficients; Transposed vectors are denoted by T; 
εit are the error terms; GDPpcit represents the GDP per capita (in the natural logarithm); 
GDPpcit–1 is the lagged dependent variable; M&Asit stands for C-B M&As as a percentage 
of GDP; M&Asit–1 is the lagged variable; REFit is the overall structural reform indicator; 
& it itM As REF⋅  is the interaction term between the overall structural reform indicator and 
C-B M&As, and CONit is a vector of growth determinants including:
 – government balance (Budgetit);
 – domestic investment as a percentage of GDP (DIit);
 – GDP per capita PPP in 1989 US$ (in the natural logarithm) (Incomeit), and
 – domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (Creditit).
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To quantify the economic effect of C-B M&As on domestic investment, we utilized the 
following panel model specification:
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where DIit represents domestic investment calculated as the difference between gross fixed 
capital formation and FDI inflows; DIit–1 is the lagged dependent variable, while CONit is a 
vector of investment determinants including:
 – lagged GDP growth (Growthit–1);
 – inflation as a variable for macroeconomic instability (Inflationit), and
 – the real interest rate (Interestit).
We used the one-period lag of growth in order to avoid a potential endogeneity problem 
as in the studies by Wang (2010) and Jude (2014). The influence of the crowding-out or 
crowding-in effects of C-B M&As on domestic investment was considered on the basis of 
the signs and magnitudes of the β2 coefficient. If this coefficient is positive and significant 
(β2>0), then an increase in C-B M&As produces a crowding-in effect and vice versa. On the 
other hand, the crowding-out of domestic investment occurs if the estimated coefficient is 
negative and significant (β2<0). 
As our base proxy variable for a country’s progress in transition, we used an overall struc-
tural reform indicator (REF) constructed from the EBRD indices of structural reforms. Since 
all the EBRD indices are highly correlated with each other (large-scale privatization, small-
scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and 
foreign exchange system, and competition policy), the use of one composite structural index 
removes problems which could occur due to multicollinearity. The values of these indicators 
can range from 1, implying little progress, to 4.3, indicating standards and the performance 
of advanced market economies. These indicators reflect expert opinion on country-specific 
reform developments in transition countries. They are useful for monitoring and tracking the 
progress of countries on their way towards a market economy. The source of this data is the 
EBRD, which has been assessing the progress of structural change since 1989.  
The overall structural reform indicator was obtained with the help of the Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) method. This technique was used to reduce the number of variables 
of interest into a smaller set of components. In this way, we acquired information on the 
overall quality of the structural reforms in the surveyed countries annually. The main argu-
ment in favour of an overall indicator instead of particular structural reform indicators is 
that foreign investors take into account various institutional factors that affect their decisions. 
We included the interaction variable in order to assess the joint effect of C-B M&As and the 
progress of structural reform on macroeconomic performance. 
We also added a dummy variable in order to evaluate the efficiency of structural reforms 
achieved during the first decade of transition. The average level of the total EBRD indicator 
(quantifying progress in six areas) for 1990–1999 was used as a criterion for the classifica-
tion of countries (see Table 1). For instance, the dummy variable D1 distinguishes countries 
with faster structural change and takes the value 1 if a country is a radical reformer with a 
total EBRD indicator above 3, and 0 otherwise (a slow and moderate reformer). The time 
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reform variable refers to the number of years required to achieve the average EBRD transition 
indicator, which amounts to 3. 
The second generation reform variable (SGR) was also included in our dynamic panel 
model specifications. This variable represents an average of three indices (large-scale priva-
tization, governance and enterprise restructuring, and competition policy) related to the 
reform areas that require more attention from policy-makers due to their complexity. The 
so-called “second generation” means that transition countries have achieved macroeconomic 
stabilization and market liberalization and, therefore, established a good basis for further 
steps of the process of structural adjustment. They are also referred as measures for deepen-
ing and sustaining market-oriented reforms whose implementation were of crucial impor-
tance for those transition countries strived to become an EU member.  It is worth noting 
that while the first phase of reforms (comprises the remaining three EBRD indices) could be 
implemented relatively quickly, the second generation reforms require more time and efforts 
from transition countries. 
Table 1. Reform-effort classification of countries included in the sample for the period 1990–1999 
(source: based on the authors calculations)
Sub-samples Countries
Radical reformers Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia 
Moderate and slow 
reformers
Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine
The data for C-B M&As (expressed as a percentage of GDP) was obtained from the UNC-
TAD FDI database. The source of data for GDP per capita, domestic credit to the private 
sector, real GDP growth, inflation measured by Consumer Price Index (annual %), and the 
real interest rate was the World Bank. Domestic Investment was calculated as the difference 
between Gross Fixed Capital Formation and inward FDI also based on data obtained from 
the same source. The data for governance balance was obtained from the EBRD and Eurostat. 
Initial conditions in transition countries are presented with the help of data on Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) Income per capita in 1989, which comes from the IMF (2000) publica-
tion (except for Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, which is based on the 
author’s calculations).
We applied a system Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimator on panel data set 
compiled from annual observations of 22 European transition countries in the 2000–2014. 
We opted for the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator since it allows us to generate consis-
tent estimates under condition of endogeneity and omitted variables. It implies the existence 
a system of original and transformed equations (Roodman 2009). This estimator is superior 
to the difference GMM estimator when dealing with time-invariant regressors, random-walk 
variables and panel with gaps. According to Blundell and Bond (1998), results on the basis 
of the difference GMM estimator should be taken with a certain amount of reserve due to 
the possibility of short sample periods and persistent series (Blundell, Bond 1998). Under 
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such circumstances, the estimator is characterized by a large sample bias and imprecision. 
In order to limit the number of instruments, we used collapse option and restrict the lag 
ranges of endogenous variables used in GMM-style instruments. We applied “Windmeijer 
finite sample correction” for standard errors in order to evaluate the precision of the two-step 
estimators (Windmeijer 2005).
We examined the consistency of this econometric technique with the help of two specifi-
cation tests. The validity of the instruments was tested using a Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions which is robust to heteroskedasticity. We also checked for second-order serial 
correlation of the residuals. In order to calculate the coefficients and standards errors for 
long term impacts we followed the method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (2005). Data 
processing was carried out using STATA software packages version 12. 
3. Empirical results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the economic effect of C-B M&As on GDP per 
capita, whose coefficients are in line with theoretical expectations. The p-values of the Han-
sen test statistic in all regressions range from 0.340 to 0.605, which indicate that our instru-
ments are not correlated with the errors. The Arellano-Bond test on the residuals in the first 
differences reveals the absence of second-order serial correlation. Taking into consideration 
the results of our diagnostic tests, we conclude that our model is appropriate specified. The 
value of the lagged GDP per capita is less than unity and it is highly statistically significant 
in all equations, suggesting the convergence. The current C-B M&As appear negative and 
significant at the 10% level in 3 out of 4 regressions. On the other hand, our empirical find-
ings indicate that their lagged level has a positive effect on GDP per capita one year later. 
The significance of their lagged value is robust to changes in variables and their coefficients 
range between 0.013 and 0.016. This means that this type of FDI requires at least a year to 
make a positive contribution to the recipient country. These coefficients are relatively stable 
and significant in all regressions.
We observe that the coefficients of the budget balance are positive and highly significant. 
This variable is consistently positive and remains significant, independently of the other 
variables involved in models. The coefficients of Income are negative in 3 out of 4 columns, 
but not significant at conventional levels. Domestic investment has a positive impact on the 
GDP per capita but also insignificant in all specifications. Domestic credit to private sector, 
as a measure of financial development, has positive and statistically significant impact on 
GDP per capita in almost all specification in Table 2.
According to our findings, the GDP per capita was significantly affected by the quality 
of structural reforms measured by composite EBRD indicator. We found enough evidence 
that progress in structural reforms is important in achieving higher GDP per capita as 
in empirical study by Efendić et al. (2010) and Beck and Leaven (2006). The interaction 
term between overall structural reform indicator and C-B M&As is negative but not sta-
tistically significant. In regression 2, we replaced the overall structural reform indicator 
with the time reform variable and obtained a coefficient which is negative and statistically 
significant as was expected. Every additional year spent implementing structural reforms 
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Table 2. Economic effect of C-B M&As on GDP per capita (source: authors calculations)
Variables 1 2 3 4
lngdppc(–1) 0.762*** (0.067) 0.774***(0.076) 0.732*** (0.077) 0.734*** (0.077)
M&As –0.054*   (0.032) –0.073    (0.049) –0.079*   (0.045) –0.049*   (0.027)
M&As (–1) 0.013**   (0.006) 0.016**  (0.006) 0.015**   (0.006) 0.013**   (0.005)
Budget 0.019*** (0.004) 0.018*** (0.004) 0.022*** (0.004) 0.020*** (0.005)
DI 0.009      (0.009) 0.017      (0.018) 0.020      (0.013) 0.012      (0.010)
Income 0.042      (0.080) –0.125    (0.132) –0.011    (0.068) –0.003     (0.078)
Credit 0.002*     (0.001) 0.003      (0.001) 0.004**   (0.002) 0.003*     (0.002)
REF 0.040**   (0.017)
REF* M&As –0.005     (0.011)
Years of reform –0.010** (0.005)
D1 0.275*** (0.081)
SGR 0.182**   (0.074)
Time Effect Yes yes yes yes
No. of Obs. 304 304 304 304
No. of groups 22 22 22 22
No. of instru-
ments 18 17 17 17
Hansen test 
(p value) 0.340 0.451 0.605 0.294
AR(2) 
(p value) 0.469 0.534 0.572 0.371
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, re-
spectively.
so as to reach the average EBRD indicator (which amounts to 3) has a negative impact on 
GDP per capita. 
We also found that countries which undertook comprehensive structural reforms dur-
ing the first decade of their transition achieved a positive impact on GDP per capita (see 
Table 1). Those countries seeking to join the EU and OECD achieved better results in the 
improvement of their institutional environment. They were encouraged to adapt common 
European legal and regulatory systems and accomplish all the necessary requirements for 
integration. These requirements were very similar to the conditions for a successful transi-
tion period. Hence, we conclude that there is no doubt that the European perspective was a 
crucial incentive for the further implementation of structural reforms. We also revealed that 
the efforts in implementing second generation structural reforms have positively reflected on 
output performance in transition countries. 
Table 3 displays the results of the effect of C-B M&As and their interaction with struc-
tural reforms on domestic investment when controlling for other macroeconomic variables. 
The p-values of the Hansen test statistics for all specifications range from 0.599 to 0.760 
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which clearly indicates that the instruments are valid. In addition, we do not find evidence 
of second-order serial correlations in the differenced residuals. The signs of the coefficients 
of the variables in Table 3 are largely as expected. The coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variable have values which are less than unity suggesting the existence of the convergence 
process. This variable has positive and highly significant coefficients in which provide sup-
port for convergence process. 
Table 3. Economic effect of C-B M&As on domestic investment (source: authors calculations)
Variables 1 2 3 4
DI (–1) 0.473***(0.088) 0.486***(0.076) 0.481***(0.087) 0.470*** (0.085)
M&As –0.598   (0.445) –0.571   (0.450) –0.477   (0.500) –0.474     (0.483)
M&As (–1) 0.326** (0.140) 0.323** (0.141) 0.314** (0.143) 0.323**   (0.323)
Growth (–1) 0.089*   (0.048) 0.079    (0.049) 0.078    (0.047) 0.081*     (0.047)
Inflation –0.052   (0.050) –0.046   (0.038) –0.052   (0.033) –0.028     (0.050)
Interest –0.104**(0.044) –0.102**(0.043) –0.100**(0.043) –0.089*   (0.047)
REF 0.041    (0.481)
REF*M&As 0.115    (0.099)
Years of reform –0.047   (0.137)
D1 0.142    (1.072)
SGR 0.832       (1.227)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 266 266 266 266
No. of groups 22 22 22 22
No. of instru-
ments 14 13 13 13
Hansen test 
(p value) 0.599 0.711 0.700 0.760
AR(2) 
(p value) 0.777 0.727 0.703 0.726
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, re-
spectively.
The current C-B M&As have a negative but highly insignificant coefficients in all col-
umns. On the other hand, the lagged C-B M&As positively affect the domestic investment 
in transition countries. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level suggest-
ing that spillover effects of this type of investment could be expected later (one year after 
merger or acquisition). The significance of their lagged value is robust to inclusion of other 
variables and their coefficients are in the range between 0.314 and 0.326. Hence, we confirm 
the results of Adams (2009) and Wang (2010) who find that the coefficient of lagged FDI 
inflows is significant with a positive sign, indicating that domestic firms enjoy benefits from 
foreign presence over time. 
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The estimated coefficients on the one-year lagged GDP growth have the predicted sign 
which is statistically significant in column 1 and 4. The coefficient of the inflation variable is 
negative, but not statistically significant in any of the specifications. As expected, the real in-
terest rate has negative sign and is significant at the 5 and 10% levels. Therefore, we conclude 
that the real interest rate variable is an important factor in explaining domestic investment 
activity. 
The contribution of overall structural reform indicator, as well as its interaction with C–B 
M&As, to domestic investment is positive but the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
Although, the signs of the coefficients of dummy variable (D1) and transition time variable 
are as expected, they turn out to be insignificant. Regarding the effect of second generation 
reforms on domestic investment, we found that this variable does not have any explanatory 
power. The coefficient has the predicted sign, but it is highly insignificant. Therefore, we 
conclude that advances in structural reforms did not have noticeable influence on domestic 
investment activity in transition countries. 
The estimated coefficients of C–B M&As and variables of structural change in the previ-
ous tables enable inferences to be drawn regarding their short-term effects. However, in order 
to get the true picture of their importance to GDP per capita and domestic investment, it is 
crucial to consider their effect over time. In regards to the long-term effect of C–B M&As on 
GDP per capita (based on the regression model with the overall structural reform indicator 
in the first column of Table 2), the coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level, but 
insignificant at the 5% level (–0.183), (see Table 4). The overall structural reform indicator 
has a positive and significant influence on economic performance, while its interaction with 
C-B M&As is negative but not significant.
Table 4. Long-run effect of changes in independent variables on GDP per capita and domestic  
investment (source: authors calculations)
Long-run coefficient
Dependent variable
GDP per capita Domestic investment
M&As –0.183*  (0.102) –1.138 (0.944)
REF 0.122*** (0.039) 0.078   (0.906)
REF* M&As –0.023   (0.039) 0.218   (0.208)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. The coefficients were calculated using the “nlcom” command in Stata 12. These results are 
based on the 1st column of Tables 2 and 3. 
According to the results in Table 4, none of the long-term coefficients (based on regres-
sion model with the structural reform indicator in Table 3) seem statistically significant at the 
conventional level of 0.10. Our results show that structural reforms and their interaction with 
C-B M&As did not contribute to domestic investment since their impacts were insignificant. 
The influence of C-B M&As is negative but also insignificant. 
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Conclusions
Our empirical findings indicate that current C–B M&As had a negative effect on GDP per 
capita while the influence of their one-year lagged level was positive and significant. Nega-
tive effect of C–B M&As on GDP per capita in the year of merger or acquisition could be 
explained by the foreign investors’ engagement in capital intensive industries and decrease in 
production due to inevitable technological and management restructuring (or the liquidation 
of the financially unstable companies). On the other hand, the lagged level of C–B M&As 
turned out to be positive and significant, which leads to the conclusion that this form of FDI 
might have a delayed mid-term effect. Increase in GDP per capita could arise from inter-
relation between domestic and foreign companies, in particular, technology spillovers. The 
improvement of functioning, organizational change and the growth in efficiency could be 
expected only in medium-term, taking into consideration structural inertia of former social-
ist enterprises. However, C–B M&As have negative and significant effect on GDP per capita 
in long-term perspective. We argue that some foreign investors tend to reduce production 
capacity and the number of employees in the long run or even opt to relocate their produc-
tion facility in countries with competitive advantages. 
We found that persistence in implementation of structural reforms results in an increase 
of the economic potential and the competitiveness of transition countries. On the other hand, 
their interaction term with C–B M&As is negative but not significant in current period. We 
found that every additional year a country spends implementing economic reforms so as 
to reach the standard of an industrialised market economy has a negative effect on GDP 
per capita. The results also indicated that countries which undertook the greatest structural 
reforms during the first decade of their transition achieved a positive impact on GDP per 
capita. We also revealed that the pursuit of second generation reforms resulted in higher 
GDP per capita.
As for impact of C–B M&As on domestic investment, we found that in the year of trans-
action and in long-term period the effects are negative and statistically insignificant. On the 
other hand, lagged C–B M&As positively affect domestic investment in transition countries 
(coefficients are highly statistically significant). It means that spillover effects of this type of 
investment can be expected not earlier than one year after the merger or acquisition. We can 
assume that the most competitive and financially stable domestic companies can temporarily 
benefit from the presence of foreign enterprises on the local market. It is worth noting that 
structural reform and its interaction with C–B M&As did not prove significant for encourag-
ing domestic investment in European transition countries. In addition, nor was the speed of 
reform implementation important for domestic investment.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. On the basis of a deeper insight 
into the literature, we found that the influence of C–B M&As on macroeconomic perfor-
mance in transition countries has not been sufficiently explored. We contribute to existing 
research by investigating the dynamic nature of cross-border mergers and acquisitions and 
their economic effects on GDP per capita and domestic investment depending on the quality 
of structural reforms. Our intention was to discover wheather structural reforms represent 
the right channel through which the positive impact of C–B M&As may be transmitted to 
GDP per capita and domestic investment in the short and long run. 
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This paper differs from existing studies on C–B M&As since it focuses on structural 
development efficiency (since the beginning of transition) as one of determinant of the eco-
nomic effects of C–B M&As. By distinguishing countries with faster institutional change 
from those relied on gradual approach, we determined the extent of influence of structural 
reforms on GDP per capita and domestic investment. 
The main limitation of our research is that we relied on EBRD indicators which are selec-
tive and do not cover all important dimensions of the transformation process. We believe that 
the main disadvantage of the EBRD data is that it only reflects expert opinion on a few dif-
ferent areas of institutional quality. In addition, a C–B M&A transaction may only be the first 
in a series and might be followed by extensive portfolio capital transactions and international 
loans. Hence, the possible economic effects of C–B M&As alone could be overestimated. We 
also did not consider special measures employed by the governments of host countries trying 
to enhance the positive economic effects of C–B M&As after transactions were completed. 
Furthermore, our data set could not be expanded since the majority of countries, especially 
those from the SEE region, started to record this type of FDI only at the beginning of the 
2000s (due to economic, social and political developments in these countries).  
Our empirical research could be extended and enriched by observing the economic effects 
of C–B M&As and total FDI inflows at the macroeconomic level. We also argue that it may 
be possible to include different aspects of formal and informal institutions and observe the 
impact of their interaction with C–B M&As. By comparing their influence on the economic 
effects of this type of FDI, we could determine which of these two institutional domains has 
had a greater impact on macroeconomic performance in host countries in transition. In ad-
dition, it could be rather important to consider the complementarity between C–B M&As 
and separate structural reform indicators. Based on these results, one can identify certain 
areas of structural policy so as to bring about positive economic effects from C–B M&As.
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